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welfare costs of bilateral quotas on textiles and apparel using
an applied general equilibrium model which covers bilateral
quotas on exports of textiles and apparel negotiated between
three major developed importing countries (the US, Canada and the
EEC) and 34 supplying developing countries under the provisions
of the Multifibre Arrangement applying in mid-1980s (MFA III)
Results using 1986 data clearly show that the vast majority
of developing countries gain from MFA removal, with some gaining
proportionately more than others. This suggests that despite
foregone rent transfers, developing countries would receive gains
by eliminating the MFA. In the central variant analysis, all
developing countries gain by eliminating tariff and MFA
restrictions because, contrary to popular belief, the developing
countries (including Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan) are
relatively small compared to developed countries even in apparel
production. Rather than losing share to other developing
countries under an MFA elimination, higher income developing
countries (like other developing countries) gain market share at
the expense of reduced developed country production.
Irene Trela John Whalley
Department of Economics Department of Economics
Social Science Centre Social Science Centre
University of Western Ontario University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario London, Ontario
CANADA N6A 5C2 CANADA N6A 5C2
I. Introduction
Trade restrictions on textile and apparel1 exports by developing
countries, under the Multi—Fibre arrangement (MFA) have been a topic of debate
and dispute for many years. Developing countries frequently cite the MEA as
one of the worst of the developed world's trade restrictions against them
since it limits their market access and restricts their development. In
contrast, it is often argued in developed countries that the transfer of quota
rents to developing countries under the MFA more than offsets their loss of
market access. This is given as a reason why developing countries generally
support successive renegotiations of the MFA. There is also a heterogeneity
of interest among developing countries which builds support for the MFA
because higher income large quota receiving original MFA countries (Hong Kong,
South Korea, and Taiwan) have a protected market niche against lower income
developing countries with low quota.
To the present authors' knowledge, however, there is no currently
available empirical work on any of these questions, and this paper is an
attempt to partially fill the gap. It provides estimates of both national and
global welfare costs of bilateral quotas on textiles and apparel using an
applied general equilibrium model which covers bilateral quotas on exports of
textiles and apparel negotiated between three major developed importing
countries (the U.S., Canada, and the EEC) and 34 supplying developing
countries under the provisions of the Multifibre Arrangement applying in
mid—l980's (MFA III).
2Results using 1986 data clearly show that the vast majority of
developing countries gain from MFA removal, with some gaining proportionately
more than others. In aggregate they gain around $11 billion. This suggests
that despite foregone rent transfers, developing countries would receive gains
by eliminating the MFA. Indeed, in the central variant analysis, all
developing countries gain by eliminating the MFA. This is because, contrary
to popular belief, the developing countries (including Hong Kong, South Korea,
and Taiwan) are relatively small compared to developed countries even in
apparel production. Thus rather than losing share to other developing
countries under an MFA elimination, higher income developing countries (like
other developing countries) gain market share at the expense of reduced
developed country production. Results also suggest annual global gains from
elimination of quotas and tariffs of around $17 billion. Gains to the U.S.
and EEC are around $3 billion each, considerably lower than existing partial
equilibrium estimates for reasons which are discussed in the text.
Sensitivity analyses suggest that a number of model features, including the
treatment of relative countcy size and assumptions made in estimating
production costs in individual developing countries are important for results,
but the main themes of results are preserved.
It. A General Equilibrium Model of Global Trade in Textiles and Apparel
Since 1974, imports of textiles and apparel by a number of major
developed countries, including the U.S. • Canada and the EEC, have been
regulated through a series of international agreements among major exporting
and importing countries, commonly known as the Multi—fibre Arrangements (MFAs)
(of which there have now been four).3 These have produced a series of
discriminatory bilateral quotas that now restrict exports by most lower cost
developing countries to the major developed countries.4
Under these agreements, licenses to export are issued to exporting
countries, who then allocate them to firms within their country. These quotas
restrict trade by limiting imports, and also further distort the pattern of
trade because of their bilateral nature. Since the quotas are specified in
physical terms, they also have the effect of encouraging upgrading of quality
by exporters. Thus, protected producers in importing countries tend to
produce lower quality items since the relative price of these increase in the
protected domestic market.
The general equilibrium model we use to analyze the effects of these
arrangements covers three major developed country importers, the U.S., Canada,
and the EEC, thirty—four developing country exporters,5 fourteen specific
textile and apparel product categories, and one composite other good.6 The
fourteen product categories reflect the constraints implied by generating a
cross country data set covering trade under the different MFA quota categories
used by the major importing countries (the U.S., Canada, and the EEC)7.
In the model, all developed countries are treated as net importers of
textiles and apparel (and exporters of the other good), while all developing
countries are modelled as exporters of textiles and apparel (and importers of
the other good). Trade in textiles and apparel among developing countries
4does not take place in the model; otherwise differences in supply prices
between these countries would be arbitraged away. Interdeveloped country
trade is quota (although not tariff) free. Thus, the model captures trade
diversion effects between developed countries due to their joint bilateral
quotas on exports by developing countries. Domestic prices in the various
developed countries therefore depend on the quota policies of all developed
countries.
We also make calculations of the impacts of quotas using a version of
the model where only one developed country (the U.S.), and the 34 developing
countries are considered. In this model variant, we illustrate how the
assumptions made on country size affect results when evaluating the effects of
quotas (and rent transfers).
The model is calibrated to a 1986 multi—country microconsistent data set
involving production, consumption, and trade in fourteen major textile and
apparel product categories and one other good (residual CDP) for each of the
thirty—seven countries captured. Data are also used on supply prices by
product by country, and estimates of key elasticity parameters.
The data used is not free of problems. For example, while there is some
(albeit limited) quota price data for Hong Kong, there is little direct
information on supply prices for other supplying countries, and an indirect
method, related to that recently used by Hamilton (1988), has to be employed.
Also, because of incompatibilities among the various quota categories used in
the major developed country MFA participants (the U.S., Canada, and the EEC),
capturing effects of quotas on interdeveloped country trade in textiles and
apparel is difficult.
5The model structure used is, in part, motivated by weaknesses of
existing studies of the welfare costs of these bilateral quotas for individual
developed countries, which are typically based on the partial equilibrium
assumptions that the importing country (e.g. the U.S.) is a small open
price—taking economy, and that full rent transfer to exporting countries
occurs (see Jenkins (1980), Morkre and Tarr (1980), Morkre (1984), Siberston
(1984), Greenaway (1986), Hufbauer et al. (1986) and Cline (1987)).
Assumed country size makes a substantial difference to the analyses
since, in the extreme case where the importing country is large, no rent
transfer occurs. Also, in assuming perfectly elastic supply functions partial
equilibrium studies tend to overestimate the costs of textile restrictions to
importing countries. In addition, these studies do not take into account the
added costs to importing countries which arise from not purchasing from the
lowest cost source of supply due to the bilateralism in the quotas. They
concentrate either on single supplying country situations, or average supply
prices across countries and then conduct single supplier analysis.
Furthermore, these studies do not capture production substitution effects in
exporting countries between various quota restricted and unrestricted
categories. Finally, the welfare costs of trade restrictions used in any one
developed country depend on the severity of restrictions in other developed
countries, since interdeveloped country trade is quota (but not tariff) free,
and these effects are not captured in existing work.
The model used here is free of these weaknesses. The relative size of
developed to deveoping countries reflects differences in GD?, and so full
rent transfer as in the small economy case, does not occur. Costs of
bilateralism reflecting imports from higher cost suppliers are captured, as
are inter—category production substitution effects, and interdeveloped country
6trade. It also provides a vehicle for estimating the effects of textile
restrictions on developing countries, something that has yet to be done in the
literature.
a) Level of Aregation in the Model
The fourteen textile and apparel products in the model involve seven
restricted and seven comparable unrestricted products. The fourteen—commodity
level of aggregation used is shown in Table 1.
This approach is employed because despite the MFA, significant volumes
of trade in textiles and apparel take place in unrestricted quota categories.
If products in unrestricted categories are treated as perfect substitutes for
quota restricted products, then in a competitive model countries would
substitute costlessly into products not subject to quota. In practice, there
are differences below the level of aggregation in Table 1 in what is
restricted and what is unrestricted and, in addition, a number of bilateral
agreements include provisions for consultations that can result in
unrestricted products being brought under restraint. An assumption of
qualitative differences between comparable restricted and unrestricted
categories is the way we treat this difficulty in the model.
b) Production
Each of thirty—seven countries in the model, including the three
developed countries, is assumed to have a nested constant elasticity of
transformation production possibilities frontier involving the fourteen
8
textile products and one composite other good,
Table 1
Coimnodity Aggretation For Textiles and Apparel Used in The flod.l1
1. Winter outerwear; rainwear; sleepwear, bathrobes and dressing gowns;
outer jackets, coats and shopcoats; dresses, skirts, suits, sets and
co—ordinates; sportscoats, blazers and fine suits
2. Pants, shorts and overalls
3. Foundation garments
4. Underwear
5. Blouses, shirts, T—shirts and sweatshirts; tailored collar shirts;
sweaters, pull—overs and cardigans
6. Hosiery
7. Textiles
8—14. Unrestricted categories comparable to categories 1—7.
1This level of aggregation reflects the constraints implied by generating as
close as comparable cross—country data set as possible to cover trade under
the different HFA quota categories used by the U.S.. Canada, and the EEC.
Such a data set is currently unavailable from any other source.
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This treatment implies that in production in each country j, there is
first substitution between individual restricted textile products (X)
and comparable unrestricted products (4), yielding composites of the
products (C?), then between the composites (Cf) yielding a composite
textile product (Ta); and finally between the composite CT3) and other
goods (A3). 6, c1, and are substitution elasticity parameters
for country j in this three level nesting structure, and the a3's, 4's
and d3's are share parameters, with Zb. 1. 6 and X. are constants
1 1 1
which define units for the composites appearing in the nesting hierarchy. The
nesting hierarchy used in each country's production is shown in Figure 1.
Fiure 1
Mestin Structure Used to Represent Production In Each CountryTA
Level 1
(Substitution between (composite textile and (composite other good)
textiles and apparel apparel commodity)
and other
manufactures)
/1/ I\
Level 2 7 textile and apparel composites
(Substitution among
7 textile and apparel
composites)
(for each of the 7)
/
Level 3 quota restricted non—quota restricted
(Substitution between
quota restricted and
comparable non—quota
restricted textile
and apparel commodities)
10
The composite other good is assumed to be freely traded. We use this as
a numeraire, and set its price equal to unity in all countries. Hence,
assuming profit maximizing behaviour, producers in each country choose
quantities X for each of the 14 product categories to maximize
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subject to (1), (2) and (3) where P are the prices prevailing in
country j for the fourteen textile and apparel commodities X?.
Since producers in all developing countries are assumed to supply to
both the domestic as well as to the quota—restricted developed country
markets, marginal production is valued at the domestic price. Because quotas
in export markets are assumed to be binding, additional production by any firm
is for the domestic not the foreign market. Quota rents accruing from sales
to developed countries thus accrue in lump sum form to owners of firms, and do
not affect the maximand (4).
This yields output supply functions
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c) Consumption
Consumer demands are generated from utility maximizing behaviour, with a
single demand side agent assumed in each country. Each agents utility
function is of nested CES form, with a structure similar to that on the
production side, i.e.,
3
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The budget constraint for the single agent in each country is
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where R3 are tariff revenues10 collected in country j, and Q3 is the
value of quota premia received on exports by country j, reflecting transfers
of quota rents from developed countries. Tariff rates t apply to
imports of product category i by developed country j.
Maximizing (12) subject to (13), (14) and (15) yields the demand
functions
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d) Trade
Each country's trade in the fourteen product categories, and in the
composite other good is given by the difference between production and
consumption. Thus, for each of the fourteen product categories, imports under
product category i by developed country k from country j, summed
over supplying countries minus exports under product category i by k to
developed country n, E, summed over developed countries, are given by
37 3 -
(24) t — £ = — xk, i=1,.. .14; k=1,...3
j=l n=1
jk
and exports by developing country j to developed country k, E. (=
kj
H. ) summed over developed countries are
3. .
(25) t E'1 = — X, i=1,...14; j=4,.. .37
k=1 1 1 1
Exports by developed country k to developing country j of the composite
other good, summed over developing countries, equal the difference
between production and consumption in the developed country, i.e.
16
(26) = Ak — ?, k=l,.. .3
j =4
and imports by developing country j from developed country k,
summed over developed countries, equal desired imports by country
j, i.e.
3.
(27) E = A3 — A3, j=4, . -.37
k=1
In equilibrium net trades in all products sum to zero across all countries.
Imports of the fourteen textile and apparel products by the developed
countries also have to satisfy the constraints implied by their bilateral
quotas, i.e.
(28) < B, i=l,.. .7; j=4, . . .37; k=l,.. .3
where are the quotas on imports of products in category i by developed
country k from developing country j. These bilateral quotas have the effect
of segmenting national markets such that different domestic prices will apply
for each of the seven restricted product categories. In applying the model,
we calibrate it to a data set in which developed country quotas are assumed to
be binding, and then examine alternative counterfactual situations in which
quotas are removed.
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e) Equilibrium
Equilibrium in the model is given by a set of country prices for the
fourteen product categories relative to the price of the composite other good.
*j * *
and revenue and quota rents for each country (Pu, R , Q ) such that
(i) Markets clear for the fourteen product categories.
37... 37
(29) t = E X. 1=1,.. .141 . 1
3=1 j=l
(ii) Markets clear for the composite other good.
37.. 37
(30) t A = Z A3j1 j=1
(iii) The government budget is balanced in each developed country (i.e.
tariff revenues collected on imports equal revenues disbursed on the
demand side of the economy).
14
.
*3 3 3 1 3(31) R = Z t.P .max(0,X. —1 Xl 1 1i=1
where t is the ad valorem tariff rate on imports of product category i
by country j,
(lv) Quotas are binding.
(32) MkJ < i=1,...l4; j=4,.. .37; k=l,. ..3
and
18
(v) Income from quota rents assumed when evaluating demands equals that
transferred by the developed countries to each exporting country.
314
(33) QJ = t Z (P. — j=4, . . .37
k=l i=1
In solving the model for counterfactual equilibria associated with
changes in or removal of bilateral quotas in the developed countries, a Newton
method is used (see Whalley (1985)). The size and direction of the Newton
steps are determined by- a Jacobian matrix containing the derivatives of
commodity excess demand functions and government budget and quota rent
imbalances with respect to prices, revenues, and quota premia. This method
uses successive linear approximations to the excess demand functions which are
solved each time for a zero of the functions, until a true equilibrium
solution is obtained.
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III. Data, Parameterization. and Elasticities
To determine parameter values for the demand and production functions in
this model, we use calibration procedures similar to those widely used in
other applied general equilibrium models (see Mansur and Whalley (1984)). We
employ a multi—country microconsistent equilibrium data set for 1986
(described below), augmented by elasticities of transformation and
substitution.
A number of data sources are used in assembling the microconsistent data
set for 1986 on which model calibration is based. Data on the value of
imports, by MFA product category and country of origin, are from the U.S.
Department of Commerce (1987a, l987b, l987c), Canadian Department of External
Affairs (unpublished data, 1987), and the European Commission (1987).12 The
major problem with this data is that it is difficult to make comparisons
across countries because of the different textile and apparel categories used
in administering quotas in each country or region. Since no such cross
country data set currently exists, we have constructed as close as comparable
14—good cross—country data set as possible to produce trade data under the
different aggregated 1-IFA quota categories used in the model. This data is
presented in Table 2.
Data on the value of production in the U.s. for textiles and apparels in
separate aggregate categories are taken from the U.S. Department of Conunerce
(l987d), while data in Canada, the EEC and the developing countries are from
the United Nations (1986).13 This data is disaggregated in order to provide
estimates of production for the fourteen product categories in the model using
the ratios of trade in the individual categories to total trade in the
corresponding broad category (textiles or apparel) by country. For each model
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product in each country, the value of consumption is determined as the
residual between the value of production and imports, on one hand, and the
value of exports on the other hand.
As noted in the introduction, data on unit costs of production of
individual textile and apparel products (supply prices) in the various
developing countries are not currently available. While the unit costs of
quota unrestricted products can be approximated by the U.S. price minus the
tariff, the problem with data arises when we try to estimate supply prices of
quota restricted products. These are central to any calculation of the impacts
of developed country textile quotas, since they affect estimates of rent
transfer per unit export.
Quotas are only freely traded in Hong Kong, with partial trading in
Taiwan and no trading in South Korea, and so quota price data in a range of
14
countries cannot be used. Also quotas are not necessarily allocated to
the most efficient producers within countries, and so even if actual costs of
current producers were known, the minimum potential unit cost for each textile
and apparel product in the various countries remains unknown. We, therefore,
use an indirect method of estimating supply prices of quota restricted items
in developing countries closely related to that used by Hamilton (1988).
We use data on U.S. quota prices of fifteen product categories for Hong
Kong for 1984,15 based on calculations made by Hamilton (1986); 1982 quota
prices are used in model sensitivity analyses reported on later. Both of
these sets of price data are given in Table 3. U.S. quota prices of the other
MFA products16 for Hong Kong are calculated on the basis of an average of
the quota prices given in Table 3. In aggregating the MFA products in the
U.S. into the seven restricted product categories used in the model, new quota
prices are calculated by taking trade weighted averages of quota prices using
the Hamilton data that fall within the categories used in the model.
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Table 3
U.S. Quota Prices1 for Textile Import Products
from Hong Kong from Hamilton (1986)
Category
Category description Number 1982 19842
Men's cotton jacket 333/334 10 23
Ladies' cotton jacket 335 20 36
Cotton Knit shirt and blouse 338/339 49 54
Men's cotton woven shirt 340 6 57
Ladies cotton woven shirt 341 11 42
Ladies cotton woven skirt 342 n.a. 44
Cotton knit sweater 345 n.a. 59
Hen's cotton pant 347 8 49
Ladies cotton pant 348 10 57
Ladies wool knit blouse 438 1 33
Wool knit sweater 445/446 21 61
Men's MMF jacket3 633/634 n.a. 23
Ladies' HMF shirt3 635 n.a. 15
MMF Knit shirt and blouse3 638/639 2 31
Men's MMF woven shirt3 640 n.a. 65
Ladies' MI4F woven blouse3 641 6 n.a.
Ladies' MMF pant 648 8
Average4 10 47
n.a. not available
'As a percent of import price.
2January to May 1984 only.
= man made fibres
4From the proportion of total export value to total export
value net of total rent.
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Our method of calculating production costs of quota restricted items in
other supplying countries is to assume that for each product category, the
unit cost can be approximated by the unit cost in Hong Kong multiplied by the
ratio of the supplying country's relative wage rate in textile and apparel
compared to Hong Kong. We apply a further correction for the relative
efficiency of labor and product quality across countries by also multiplying
by each country's relative value of gross output per worker in textiles and
apparel compared to Hong Kong. This makes a large difference to estimated
supply prices.17 Value of gross output per worker is given by dividing
wages per employee by wages in value added, and then dividing by value added
in gross output. Data on wages per employee, value added in gross output and
wages in valued added, for textiles and apparel are from UNIDO (1985). The
resulting average18 supply prices of quota restricted products by country,
both adjusted and unadjusted for differences in labour productivity and
product quality, and for both 1982 and 1984, are presented in Table 4. As can
be seen the correction for labour productivity and product quality makes a
very large difference to these estimates; as large as a factor of ten in some
cases.
The value of production of other goods in all countries is given by
subtracting the value of production of textile and apparel products from CDP
in each country. Data on GDP by country are from the World Bank (1986) and
from Europa (1987). External sector balance conditions are then used to
calculate the value of trade in other goods in each country.
The model also requires elasticity values for transformation surfaces
and preferences in each country. For the bottom level of nesting, assumed
values of —0.50 and 5.0 are used for all pairwise nests between comparable
restricted and unrestricted commodities and in all countries. Given there are
24
Table 4
Average Supply Prices of Quota Restricted
Textiles and Apparel by Country 1982 and 1984
Adjusted
for differences in
labour productivity
Unadjusted
for differences in
labour productivity
and product quality and product quality
Exporting Country 1982 1984 1982 1984
Bangladesh 0.41 0.35 0.04 0.04
Brazil 0.35 0.31 0.34 0.30
Bulgaria 0.77 0.67 0.43 0.37
China 0.63 0.55 0.11 0.10
Columbia 0.53 0.47 0.35 0.31
Czechoslovakia 0.77 0.68 0.42 0.37
Costa Rica 0.71 0.62 0.60 0.53
Dominican Republic 0.77 0.68 0.36 0.31
Egypt 0.68 0.59 0.18 0.15
Guatemala 0.68 0.59 0.34 0.30
Haiti 0.63 0.55 0.14 0.13
Hong Kong 0.77 0.68 0.71 0.68
Hungary 0.60 0.53 0.23 0.20
India 0.63 0.55 0.09 0.08
Indonesia 0.59 0.52 0.09 0.08
Korea 0.56 0.49 0.43 0.38
Macau 0.68 0.59 0.69 0.60
Malaysia 0.53 0.46 0.22 0.19
Mauritius 0.59 0.52 0.18 0.16
Mexico 0.68 0.59 0.72 0.63
Nepal 0.63 0.55 0.06 0.05
Pakistan 0.63 0.55 0.12 0.10
Panama 0.77 0.68 0.54 0.47
Peru 0.68 0.59 0.34 0.30
Philippines 0.70 0.62 0.14 0.12
Poland 0.77 0.67 0.43 0.37
Romania 0.68 0.59 0.77 0.68
Singapore 0.71 0.62 0.62 0.54
Sri Lanka 0.63 0.55 0.13 0.11
Taiwan 0.68 0.59 0.67 0.59
Thailand 0.68 0.59 0.22 0.19
Turkey 0.36 0.31 0.40 0.35
Uruguay 0.72 0.63 0.74 0.65
Yugoslavia 0.66 0.57 0.52 0.45
Source: Based on data from Hamilton (1986) and methods described in the text.
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no literature estimates to guide the choice of these values we justify our
specification as follows. An assumption of smooth substitutability in
production between comparable restricted and unrestricted conunodjtjes would
not be appropriate, since there would be no effect of the quotas. Therefore,
a low elasticity value is used for all countries, implying a limited ability
to substitute products on the supply side. In contrast, a high degree of
substitutability is assumed on the demand side of the model. This has some
claim to plausibility since from the consumers point of view the relative
difference in product characteristics is small.
Elasticity values at the top two levels are calculated as follows. For
the developed countries, we base our selection of these values on estimates of
U.S. total demand elasticities and assumed supply elasticities of 1.5. For
the developing countries, we assume a Cobb—Douglas specification for both
transformation and preference functions, which is equivalent to setting all
these elasticities to unity.19 Because of the potentially crucial nature of
these elasticity values for model behaviour, we use a central set of
elasticity values around which sensitivity analyses are performed.
The U.S. total demand elasticity of —0.60 is based on estimates of this
elasticity for textiles and apparel, reported in Cline (1987). Since no
comparable information on supply elasticities is available we use a value of
1.5, which is intermediate to a range of assumed values used by other
researchers (see, for instance, Jenkins and Creenaway op. cit.). We calculate
implied elasticities of transformation and substitution for the top two levels
of nesting in the developed countries20 consistent with these estimates.
These values are, however, not necessarily consistent with literature
26
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estimates of import demand elasticities for textiles and apparel,
reflecting the well known incompatibilties between literature estimates of
demand and supply elasticities on the one hand, and import demand elasticities
on the other.
The calibration procedures used to generate the parameter values for the
model involve first decomposing the data represented in value terms into
separate price and quantity data. This is done through a units convention
which defines physical units for all commodities as those amounts which in
equilibrium, sell in the U.S. for $1. Hence domestic prices in developing
countries for quota restricted items are less than one, and domestic prices in
Canada and the EEC are less than, greater than, or equal to one, depending
upon the direction of trade. Once elasticity values have been selected, share
parameters for the CES and CET functions in the model are given from the price
and quantity data and the assumption of agent optimization in each country.
For instance, first order conditions from profit maximization allow the
share parameters a, b', and d3 to be calculated as
(34) a = 1
_,
3=1,. . .37
01
1÷pIt
—1
b (p.\(C\
(35) = (_!II_.._ , i=1,...7; Q=i÷7; j=1,...37
b3
9. C 1
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(36) d =
—1 i=l. ..7; t=i+7; j=l,...37
1
\\PC1Ax)
A similar procedure can be used to calculate the demand side share parameters
j j j
a • b. and d.1 1
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IV. Results
The general equilibrium model described above has been used to analyze a
variety of possible changes in quota and tariff restrictions used by
developed countries towards imports of textiles and apparel. In these
analyses major focus is on welfare effects, reported as Hicksian equivalent
variations (EVs)22 by country in billions of 1986 dollars, but trade volume
and production effects are also reported. We have also made calculations
using the simple one developed country version of the same model in which the
size of developing countries is changed. Results using this version of the
model provide a basis for comparison on the issue of rent transfer effects and
the treatment of developed countries as small open economies, as assumed in
partial equilibrium analyses. We first report calculations made using the
basic variant of our model where the three major developed countries and the
34 developing countries are considered, and evaluate the effects of abolishing
developed country bilateral quotas and/or tariffs covering the fourteen
textile product categories considered by the model. Table 5 presents the
welfare, production, and trade effects of removing both developed country
bilateral quotas and tariffs on the fourteen textile products covered by the
model. Results clearly show that all developing countries gain from the
removal of restrictions on trade in textiles and apparel, with some gaining
proportionately more than others. The effects by country reflect the price
changes in each country, as well as the rent transfer effects of the bilateral
quotas. In aggregate, developing countries gain $11.29 billion, suggesting
that gains to developing countries from improved access more than offset
losses from forgone rent transfers as the MFA is abolished. This is even the
case for relatively larger holders of quotas such as Korea, Hong Kong, and
other higher income NICS, whom it has always been argued, have a protected
Table 5
General Equllibriue Effects of Renoving Bilateral MFA
Quotas and Tariffs in all Developed Countries'
Hicksian EV's Change in value of Change in value of imports
(S billions 966) production of textiles or exports of textiles
at benchmark pr ces at benchmark prices
(%) (%)
United States 2.59
—6.34 243.94
Canada 0.24
-6.06 213.96
EEC 3.11
—4.72 263.64
Exporting Countries
Bangladesh 0.34 57.80 329.67
Brazil 1.03 67.39 400.27
Bulgaria 0.00 8.58 58.42
China 2.34 11.68 425.44
Cohsnbia 0.36 30.88 899.94
Czechoslovakia 0.14 3.64 484.52Costa Rica 0.01 10.79 35.89
Daninican Republic 0.01 7.09 21.11
Egypt 0.07 3.78 790.93
Guatmnale 0.00 12.62 214.28
Haiti 0.01 18.24 48.57
Hong Kong 0.24 3.30 45.61
Hungary 0.14 20.07 181.97
India 0.16 6.13 129.35
Indonesia 0.45 46.86 409.16
Korea 2.09 31.94 241.04
Macau 0.02 0.94 11.45
Malaysia 0.24 43.40 189.62
Mauritius 0.04 27.51 118.39
Mexico 0.18 9.43 580.55
Nepal 0.02 6.45 200.85
Pakistan 0.02 16.47 29.63
Panama 0.00 5.98 71.98
Peru 0.06 13.21 356.11
Philippines 0.25 26.31 179.28
Poland 0.20 12.29 432.15
Ranania 0.17 24.44 150.29
Singapore 0.59 31.42 88.43
Sri Lanka 0.09 41.12 103.22
Taiwan 1.40 25.06 207.84
Thailand 0.06 26.34 63.43
Turkey 0.81 22.30 108.63
Uruguay 0.01 12.62 85.57
Yugoslavia 0.12 1.07 63.94
All Developing 11.29
Countries
All Countries 17.25
'Transformation and substitution elasticities set equal to -0.5 and 5.0 in the bottan
level of nesting for all countries in the model. In the top two levels, elasticities of
transformation and substitution in all developed countries reflect literature estimates of
U.S. total denand elastIcities and assumed supply elasticities of 1.5. The elasticities are
.0.50 and 1.60 In .11 developed countries. Cobb—Douglas specifications are used at the top
two levels in all developing countries.
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market niche against lower cost competition under the MFA. In the presence of
quotas they, along with other developing countries, are non—marginal
suppliers to developed country markets. Removing quotas improves all
supplying developing country's market share in developed country markets
rather than reallocating share among them.
The global welfare gain is $17.25 billion with gains to the U.S. of
$2.59 billion. This estimate is significantly lower than that of dine (1987)
who places the net welfare cost of textile and apparel protection in the U.S.
at around $8 billion using 1986 data. However, dine uses a partial
equilibrium approach which tends to overstate the welfare costs of protection
to the U.S., because it implies full rent transfer. Importantly, this
difference in results occurs even though our model captures the added costs of
bilateralism in these trade restrictions, while dine does not.
In Table 6 we report results where bilateral quotas alone are removed,
leaving tariffs in place. In this case all developing countries are worse off
compared to the case in Table 5, because their market access is reduced by
developed country tariffs. Even larger gains result for the developed
countries. This reflects their more advantageous terms of trade as a result
of not also eliminating their tariffs, indicating that in the non—small open
economy case, optimal tariffs for developed countries are non—zero, and that
1986 tariff levels are below optimal tariffs. This again emphasizes the
difference in the analysis from the small open economy case.
The sensitivity of these results has been tested through a series of
experiments reported on in Tables 7, 8 and 9. Table 7 reports the impacts on
results of various changes in elasticity values for transformation surfaces
and preferences in each country. Table 8 provides an indication of the
magnitudes involved as assumptions on supply prices by country are changed.
Table 9 reports the effects on results if the composite other good is defined
to be other manufactures instead of residual GOP23
Table 6
Welfare and Trade Effects of RmiovlngBl lateral Quotas But Not Tariffs1
Hicksian EVs Change in value of Change in value of imports
(S billions 1986) production of textiles or exports of textiles
at benchmark prices at benchmark prices
(%) (%)
United States 5.16 —3.38 132.78
Canada 0.36 -2.62 84.45
EEC 5.41 —4.95 253.94
Exporting Countries
Bangladesh 0.25 43.07 211.46
Brazil 0.81 56.66 319.83
Bulgaria 0.00 -0.06 -9.39
China 1.11 6.89 241.52
Columbia 0.27 23.73 651 .71
Czechoslovakia 0.04 7.31 253.25
Costa Rica 0.00 0.41 -0.50
Dominican Republic 0.00 —2.06 -6.94
Egypt 0.03 8.48 490.95
Guatemala 0.00 6.00 98.49
Haiti 0.00 8.95 20.94
Hong Kong —0.40 6.44 24.48
Hungary 0.07 14.12 122.03
India 0.00 2.31 41.45
Indonesia 0.20 31.30 275.42
Korea 1.10 24.48 84.77
Macau —0.03 0.70 12.85
Malaysia 0.15 34.36 46.45
Mauritius 0.02 19.80 81.83
Mexico 0.06 4.28 163.89
Nepal 0.01 10.28 120.29
Pakistan —0.01 9.49 6.84
Paneme 0.00 3.99 22.02
Peru 0.03 7.52 199.24
Philippines 0.10 16.98 113.55
Poland 0.08 5.92 198.72
Rumania 0.04 13.63 80.17
Singapore —0.02 17.89 51.57
Sri Lanka 0.01 27.72 69.67
Taiwan 0.40 6.20 138.61
Thailand —0.02 15.42 36.91
Turkey 0.48 15.81 72.80
Uruguay 0.00 6.75 45.75
Yugoslavia 0.00 5.88 34.13
All Developing 4.83
Countries
All Countries 15.77
1Transformation and substitution elasticities set equal to -.0.5 and 5.0 in the bottom level
of nesting for all countries in the model. In the top two levels, elosticities of transformation
and substitution in all developed countries reflect literature estimates of U.S. total demand
elasticities and assumed supply elasticities of 1.5. The elasticitIes are —0.50 and 1.60 in all
developed countries. Cobb—Douglas specifications ore used at the top two levels In all developing
countries.
Table 7
Effects of Changes in Elasticity Values on Results
(Hicksian Equivalent Variations in billions of 1986 dollars)
Case I Case 2 Case 3
United States 3.02 0.51 3.49
Canada 0.27 0.08 0.38
EEC 3.34 2.18 4.88
Exporting Countries
Bangladesh 0.32 0.32 0.62
Brazil 0.99 0.86 1.67
Bulgaria 0.00 0.01 0.00
China 2.09 2.14 2.93
Columbia 0.34 0.33 0.52
Czechoslovakia 0.12 0.13 0.16
Costa Rica 0.01 0.02 0.02
Dcgninican Republic 0.01 0.03 0.01
Egypt 0.06 0.06 0.08
Guatenala 0.00 0.01 0.01
Haiti 0.01 0.02 0.02
Hong Kong 0.11 0.46 0.22
Hungary 0.13 0.14 0.21
India 0.13 0.21 0.21
Indonesia 0.39 0.37 0.52
Korea 1.90 1.80 2.56
Macau 0.01 0.04 0.03
Malaysia 0.22 0.22 0.34
Mauritius 0.03 0.04 0.05
Mexico 0.14 0.19 0.21
Nepal 0.02 0.02 0.03
Pakistan 0.01 0.04 0.03
Panama 0.00 0.00 0.00
Peru 0.06 0.06 0.08
Philippines 0.22 0.25 0.32
Poland 0.18 0.21 0.26
Rumania 0.14 0.17 0.21
Singapore 0.04 0.07 0.05
Sri Lanka 0.07 0.08 0.10
Taiwan 1.19 1.23 1.50
Thailand 0.04 0.07 0.07
Turkey 0.74 0.68 1.22
Uruguay 0.00 0.01 0.01
Yugoslavia 0.09 0.17 0.17
All Developing
Countries 9.97 10.60 14.62
All Countries 16.61 13.39 23.39
Case I: As in Table 5, but with Cobb—Douglas specifications used at the top
two levels of nesting of transformation and preference functions in
all developed countries.
Case 2: As in Table 5 but with both transformation and substitution
elasticities set equal to 0.50 in the top two levels of nesting in
all developing countries in the model.
Case 3: As in Table 5, but with transformation and substitution elasticities
set equal to —2.5 and 7.0 in the bottan level of nesting in all
countries in the model.
Table 8
Effects of Changes In Assirptlons on Supply PrIces and Other
Sensitivy Analyses on Results (Hlcksian Equivalent Variations
in billions of 1986 dollars)
Case I Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
United States 2.59 0.88 23.67 2.51
Canada 0.24 0.06 2.00 0.24
EEC 3.11 1.44 18.23 3.09
Exporting Countries
Bangladesh 0.34 0.30 2.85 0.29
Brazil 1.05 0.92 0.28 0.97
Bulgaria 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
China 2.34 1.21 37.32 2.30
Coliatia 0.14 0.24 0.25 0.35
Czechoslovakia 0.01 0.03 0.93 0.13
Costa Rica 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
Doninican Republic 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.01
Egypt 0.00 0.01 2.27 0.06
Guatenale 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00
Haiti 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.01
Hong Kong 0.24 0.21 -1.06 0.28
Hunyary 0.14 0.09 0.46 0.14
India 0.16 0.17 3.05 0.16
Indonesia 0.45 0.28 13.57 0.40
Korea 2.09 1.27 1.33 2.07
Macau 0.02 0.06 —0.12 0.07
Malaysia 0.24 0.18 0.62 0.23
Mauritius 0.04 0.03 0.19 0.03
Mexico 0.18 0.08 0.38 0.18
Nepal 0.02 0.01 .99 0.02
Pakistan 0.02 0.03 0.32 0.02
Pavana 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Peru 0.06 0.02 0.33 0.06
Philippines 0.25 0.16 1.75 0.24
Poland 0.20 0.07 0.18 0.20
Ranania 0.17 0.11 —0.04 0.16
Singapore 0.59 0.04 -0.08 0.05
Sri Lanke0.09 0.07 0.38 0.06
Taiwan 1.40 0.91 -0.45 1.41
Thailand 0.06 0.05 0.29 0.05
Turkey 0.81 0.68 0.02 0.18
Uruguay 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
Yugoslavia 0.12 0.08 0.01 0.13
All Developing
Countries 11.29 7.50 73.81 11.06
All Countries 17.25 9.90 117.72 16.92
Case I: As In Table 5.
Case 2: As In Tables, except that supply prices in Hong Kong are
based on 1982 quota prices.
Case 3: As in Table 5, except that for each developing country the
ratio of theIr relative wage rate (canpared to the Hong Kong
base) is used as en indicator of relative product price at
international values. No account is taken for differences In
labour productIvity or product quality.
Cese4: As In Table 5, except that the canposite other good Is defIned
to be other manufactures Instead of residual GOP.
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Results in Table 7 suggest that for some of the countries results are
highly sensitive to changes in elasticities, while others are less so. The
degree of sensitivity seems to be collinear with the size of the country price
effects, and corresponding quantity effects, which are produced when tariffs
and quotas are eliminated. If supply prices for quota restricted products in
Hong Kong are calculated using 1982 rather than 1984 quota prices (Case 2 of
Table 8), supply prices in all developing countries for these products rise.
Both the welfare estimates and the size of quota rents transferred to
foreigners are reduced when this happens.
Case 3 of Table 8 shows that if relative wage rates (compared to Hong
Kong) are used as an indicator of relative product supply prices, this has a
significant impact on our welfare measures. Prices of quota restricted
products decrease considerably in all developing countries, except Brazil,
Macau, Mexico, Romania, Turkey and Uruguay where prices increase. The effect
of decreasing supply prices is to expand the differentials between foreign
production costs and the price paid by importers. As a result, developed
countries gain even more from elimination of textile and apparel protection.
Some developing countries are worse off, while others are better off. In
aggregate they gain more, despite greater forgone rent transfers. Finally,
results in column 4 of Table 8 show that using an alternative definition of
the composite other good to cover only other manufactures rather than residual
GDP does not have large effects on results.
To illustrate how important assumptions on country size are when
evaluating rent transfer effects, we report some calculations made using the
simple version of our model, where only the U.S. and the 34 developing
countries are considered. We consider the effects of abolishing both U.S.
bilateral quotas and tariffs.
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Table 9 shows the overestimate of the effects obtained when the size of
developing countries is increased in the base period data to which the model
is calibrated, since greater rent transfers to exporting countries occur.
Estimates of welfare effects of both developing and developed countries differ
by almost a factor of 1.5, even though quota premia and elasticity values
underlying the calculation are the same. Both the welfare estimates and the
size of quota rents transfered to foreigners are reduced when the size of
developing countries is decreased. These results suggest that treating
developed countries as price takers as in partial equilibrium calculations
tends to overestimate the effects of quota and tariff restrictions on U.S.
welfare.
Comparing Case 1 of this Table with the results in Table 5, where quotas
changes also occur in the EEC and Canada provides some sense of trade
diversion effects of quotas between developed countries.24 The estimate for
the cost of U.S. restrictions only considering the developing countries is
more than two times that when all developed countries remove their quotas,
since the trade diversion effects which occur between the U.S. and the other
developed countries do not enter the calculation in Table 9.
V. Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes the impacts of bilateral quota restrictions used by
three major developed countries against textile and clothing imports under the
Multifibre Arrangement from developing countries. A numerical general
equilibrium model of global trade in fourteen key textile and apparel
categories involving 3 developed and 34 developing countries is used.
Table 9
A CaTQirlson of the Effects of Changes In Country Size
on Estimates of Removing U.S. Bilateral Quotes and Tariffs1
(Hicksian Equivalent Variations In billions of 986 dollars)
Case I Case 2 Case 3
United States 5.60 10.29 3.68
Exporting Countries
Bangladesh 0.24 0.34 0.21
Brazil 0.47 0.B2 0.3B
Bulgaria 0.07 0.04 0.08
China 1.16 1.05 .20
Columbia 0.26 0.35 0.23
Czechoslovakia 0.03 0.02 0.03
Costa Rica 0.01 0.01 0.01
Duminican Republic 0.02 0.02 0.02
Egypt 0.02 0.01 0.02
Guatmnala 0.00 0.00 0.00
Haiti 0.01 0.01 0.00
Hong Kong 0.11 —0.13 0.11
Hun9ary
0.07 0.08 0.06
India 0.12 0.13 0.12
Indonesia 0.34 0.35 0.33
Korea 1.61 I.B5 1.51
Macau 0.01 0.00 0.02
Malaysia 0.14 0.21 0.12
Mauritius 0.01 0.02 0.02
Mexico 0.06 0.06 0.07
Nepal 0.01 0.01 0.01
Pakistan 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panama 0.00 0.00 0.00
Peru 0.03 0.03 0.03
Philippines 0.lB 0.20 0.17
Poland 0.14 0.10 0.16
Rcniania 0.02 0.02 0.02
Singapore 0.03 0.00 0.04
Sri Lanka 0.03 0.01 0.03
Taiwan 0.67 0.59 0.70
Thailand 0.01 0.00 0.01
Turkey 0.61 0.93 0.52
Uruguay 0.04 0.02 0.02
Yugoslavia 0.19 0.19 0.18
All Developing
Countries 6.89 7.51 6.61
All Cowtries 12.49 17.81 10.29
Case I: Developing country size reflects benchmark data set.
Case 2: Developing country size is two times that of the benchmark.
Case 3: Developing country size is three quarters that of the benchmark.
Transformation and substitution elasticities set equal to —0.5 and
5.0 in the bottczn level of nesting for all countries in the model. In the top
two levels, elasticity values of —0.5 and 1.60 for transformation surfaces and
preferences in the U.S. reflect literature estimates of U.S. total demand
elasticities and an assumed supply elasticity of 1.5. Cobb—Douglas
specifications are used at the top two levels in all developing countries.
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In the model, countries are represented by their actual size in terms of GDP,
weakening rent transfer effects compared to partial equilibrium analysis.
We evaluate both the national and global welfare costs of the bilateral
quotas captured by the model. Using data for 1986, results suggest global
gains from elimination of quotas and tariffs of over $17 billion. The largest
part of these accrue to the developing countries who, in aggregate, gain
around $11 billion. This suggests that despite foregone rent transfers,
developing countries would receive gains from eliminating textile and apparel
protection through improved access to developed country markets.
Results also show all developing countries gaining in the central
variant of the model from an elimination of the MFA, contrary to popular
belief which suggests that higher income large quota recipient countries (such
as Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan) would lose. In the model, since all of
the developing country suppliers are quota constrained and relatively small
compared to large developed countries, they increase their market share at the
expense of developed country producers rather than lose share to other
developing countries.
Estimates of the gains to the U.S. from the model for the removal of
quotas are significantly lower than those of other partial equilibrium
studies, such as dine (1987), who places the net welfare cost of textile and
apparel protection in the U.S. at around *8 billion, rather than the *3
billion reported here. This divergence in results occurs even though our
model captures the added costs of bilateralism. The difference stems from the
partial equilibrium assumptions of price taking behaviour for large developed
countries, which will tend to cause the costs of textile and apparel
protection to be overstated. As might be expected, results show sensitivity
with respect to elasticity parameters and assumptions as to how supply prices
vary across countries, but the main themes of results remain.
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Notes
1. In the paper we will use the the combination of terms "textiles",
"textiles and apparel' and "textile products" interchangeably to refer
to clothing, fabrics, and yarns.
2. There are, however, other effects of these restrictions not adequately
captured by our approach. The most important is substitution into
higher quality due to quotas (see Falvey (1979)). Quantifying quality
effects due to textile quotas is extremely difficult, and to our
knowledge has yet to be attempted.
3. The predecessor for the MFA was the 1961 Short—Term Arrangement
Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles. This was followed in
1962 by a comparable Long—Term Arrangement, which expired in 1973.
4. Most developed countries continue to impose tariffs on textile imports.
Over the years GATT negotiations have slightly reduced these tariffs,
but not to the same degree as for other manufactured products.
5. These are: Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Columbia,
Czechoslovakia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Guatemala, Haiti,
Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Macau,
Malaysia, Mexico, Nepal, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Romania, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, and
Yugoslavia.
6. We define the composite other good to be residual GDP in the basic
variant our model; 'other manufactures' are used in our sensitivity
analysis reported on later.
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7. We were unable to include all the MFA quota categories in each country
since they include products which belong to more than one of the
fourteen specific product categories we identify in our model. The
categories not included are: handkerchiefs (categories 330 and 630).
gloves (331, 431 and 631) and other apparel (359, 459, 659) in the U.S.;
work gloves (31) and swimwear (44) in Canada; and handkerchiefs (19),
knitted gloves (10), swirnwear (72), shawls and scarves (84), woven ties
(85), and other clothing accesories (88) in the EEC.
8. The index i runs from 1,. ..7 for the restricted products and for the
unrestricted products from 8,.. .14.
9. The index j runs from 1,. ..3 for developed countries and for developing
countries from 4,.. .37.
10. In numerically solving the model, we also introduce non—distorting
production taxes in the developed countries on all products. Without
these taxes, government revenue arise only from tariffs and tend to be
highly sensitive to changes in prices since they depend on the value of
net trades. These taxes are non—distorting, do not alter relative
prices of outputs, and have no effect on the equilibrium solution
produced by the model.
11. In our model revenue and quota rents are separately identified, since
for developed countries revenues are positive and quota rents are zero,
and for developing countries the opposite is true.
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12. In using this data we assume that all bilateral quotas were fully
binding in the year in question. Whether textile quotas are or are not
binding has been a source of controversy for some time. For some
exporting countries not all the allocated (category—specific) quotas are
fully utilized in any given year (see GATT (1984) and USITC (1987)).
Thus it appears, at first sight, that the cost to the U.S. of imposing
these restraints may be overestimated by the model. However, there are
many reasons why data for export countries can seem to indicate
non—binding quotas and yet in fact be binding. Quotas assigned to firms
within an exporting country may not be fully utilized due to capacity
constraints within firms and the unwillingness of firms to reassign or
reallocate quota (or sell if there are legal markets) for fear of losing
their quota allocation in future years. Other reasons can lie in the
way quota is allocated among importers. Textile quotas in the EEC, for
instance, are often allocated between importing countries on the basis
of historical market shares with no trading of quota across countries,
so that quotas for, say, oats can be binding in Northern Europe but not
in Southern Europe. Also sub—aggregate quotas, say for types of shirts,
may be greater than an aggregate quota for shirts and hence not appear
to be binding at subaggregate level while be binding at aggregate
level.
13. We were unable to obtain production data for some of the developing
countries. In these cases trade data, along with estimates of mill
consumption to export ratios obtained from FAO (1985) were used to
calculate the value of production of each of the fourteen product
categories in each country.
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14. The quota price data that exists is also heavily contaminated by the
complexities of quota allocation schemes within countries. Thus a firm
which openly and repeatodly sells quota, risks losing some or all of its
quota allocation in future years. There is even the possibility of
firms producing where their cost of productiun is above the import price
in the consuming market to keep quota in future years. Quota price data
also reveals wide fluctuations on a month by month basis (see Morke
(1984) and Hamilton (1986)) in part because of the fashion component of
textiles trade and the need to maintain flexibility to enter various
product markets quickly to exploit emerging trends.
15. Tariffs on U.S. imports of textiles and apparel also enter this
calculation, and these are obtained from CATT (1984).
16. The bilateral agreements in the U.S. invole comprehensive product
coverage, which divides all the MFA products into 109 categories.
17. Hamilton (1988) analyzes these differences between Hong Kong. Taiwan,
and South Korea and concludes they are small and can be ignored. Here.
with 35 supplying countries, these factors become considerably more
important.
Arithmetic average of all supply prices within the category.
The reason for making this assumption is because there are currently no
estimates of import or export demand elasticities for the developing
countries from which implied transformation and substitution
elasticities can be calculated.
20. We assume consuon values between nests.
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21. Hufbauer et al. (1986) believe a conservative estimate of import
elasticity of demand for imported textiles and apparel in the U.S. to be
about —1.8. We estimate import elasticity of demand in the U.S. at —8.9.
22. Welfare estimates under Hicksian equivalent and compensating measures
are very close, and so only EVs are reported.
23. In making this calculation, data on total manufacturing output by
country are taken from the same sources as production data. However,
data was unavailable for some of the developing countries. In these
cases production data, along with estimates of the share of textiles and
clothing in manufacturing production from GATT (1984) were used to
calculate the value of total manufacturing production in each country.
24. There is some bias in making this comparison since in Case 1 of Table 5
all developed country bilateral quotas and tariffs are eliminated,
whereas in Case 1 of Table 9 only bilateral quotas and tariffs in the
U.S. are removed. Thus, not only are we capturing the trade diversion
effects but also the effects of abolishing textile and apparel
protection in Canada and the EEC, as well as in the U.S. Therefore, the
comparison should be interpreted with caution.
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